Privacy has traditionally been a major motivation for distributed problem solving. Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DisCSP) as well as Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) are fundamental models used to solve various families of distributed problems. Even though several approaches have been proposed to quantify and preserve privacy in such problems, none of them is exempt from limitations. Here we approach the problem by assuming that computation is performed among utilitarian agents. We introduce a utilitarian approach where the utility of each state is estimated as the difference between the reward for reaching an agreement on assignments of shared variables and the cost of privacy loss. We investigate extensions to solvers where agents integrate the utility function to guide their search and decide which action to perform, defining thereby their policy. We show that these extended solvers succeed in significantly reducing privacy loss without significant degradation of the solution quality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is an important problem in a lot of distributed applications, therefore, the reward for solving the problem should be considered, but also the cost of privacy loss during the process [22] . For example, when users exchange information on social networks [32] , they reveal (often unconsciously) personal data (e.g., age, address, date of birth). Related studies were also performed in the domain of Ambient Intelligence which is concerned with the distributed management of confidential information between different components (e.g., camera, computer, PDA), to allow or prevent the sharing of resource information [47] .
In distributed scheduling problems, confidentiality also happen when information is exchanged between agents/participants (for example, a participant does not want to reveal his/her unavailability for a time slot because the explanation concerns his/her private life, and it should not be necessarily discussed publicly). Indeed, we know that the assignment of time slots can be difficult if participants do not want to reveal their constraints [18] , [10] . Such coordinated decisions are in conflict with the need to keep constraints private [16] . We consider that these coordinated decisions may be defined by a set of different constraints distributed among different agents.
In Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problems (DisCSPs) and Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems (DCOPs), agents have to assign values to variables while respecting given constraints. To find such assignments, agents exchange messages until a solution is found or until an agent detects that there is none. Thus, agents have to reveal information during search, causing privacy to be a major concern in DisCSPs [62] , [26] . If an agent is concerned about its privacy, then it can associate a cost to the revelation of each information in its local problem. This cost may be embedded into utility driven reasoning.
A common assumption is that utility-based agents associate each state with a utility value [48] . As such, each communication action's utility is evaluated as the difference between initial and final utilities. Indeed, if an agent is concerned about its privacy, then it can associate a cost to the revelation of each information in its local problem. Since they are interested in solving the problem, they must also be able to quantify the reward they draw from finding the solution. Here we approach the problem by assuming that privacy is a utility that can be aggregated with the reward for solving this problem. We evaluate how much privacy is lost by the agents during the problem solving process, by the sum of the utility lost for each information that was revealed. For example, the existence and availability of a value from the domain of a variable is the kind of information that the agents want to keep private. The cost of a constraint for a solution is another example of information that agents would like to keep private.
While sometimes possibilistic reasoning is used to guide search, agents were usually assumed to participate in the search process until an agreement is found between all different agents (i.e., a solution). We investigate the case where an agent may modify its search process to optimize utility. Two extensions are introduced, Utilitarian Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (UDisCSP) and Utilitarian Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (UDCOP), addressing DisCSPs and DCOPs, respectively. These extensions exploit the rewards of agreements and costs representing privacy loss as guidance for the utilitybased agents, where the utility of each state is estimated as the difference between the expected rewards for agreements, and the expected cost representing privacy loss. In this work, Distributed Constrained Problem (DisCP) will refer to both DisCSP and DCOP. Similarly, Utilitarian Distributed Constrained Problems (UDisCPs) will refer to both UDisCSPs and UDCOPs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents existing research concerning solving algorithms and approaches to privacy for DisCPs. Further, Section III describes the concepts and solvers involved in UDisCP to preserve privacy. Section IV discusses theoretical implications. Section V reports our experimental results and evaluates privacy loss on distributed meeting scheduling (DMS) problems. Section VI presents our conclusions and our directions for future research.
II. BACKGROUND We present distributed constrained problems (II-A), and existing approaches for privacy as well as their limits (II-B).

A. Distributed Constrained Problem
Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problems (DisCSPs) and Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems (DCOPs) have been extensively studied as a fundamental way of modelling constrained problems in multi-agent systems, and will be defined in the following, as well as existing solvers.
1) Definitions: Let us first remind the definitions of the Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DisCSP) and of the Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) [62] .
Definition 1. A Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) is formally defined as a tuple A , X , D, C where:
• A = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A m } is a finite set of m agents.
• X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n } is a finite set of n variables. Each agent A self encapsulates variables denoted X (A self ) (with
. . , D n is a set of n domains. D self is the set of possible values for X (A self ).
• C = {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C e } is a finite set of e valued constraints. Each constraint C i involves some variables X (C i ) ⊆ X defining a cost (positive value) for assignments. We note that C self = {C i ∈ C |X (C i ) ∩ X (A self ) = ∅}. The objective is to find an assignment for each variable that minimizes the total cost.
Definition 2. A Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DisCSP) is defined as a DCOP where the constraints are predicates, each one defining for sets of assignments a cost of ∞ (constraint violation). The problem is to find an assignment to variables that does not violate any constraint.
Definition 3. Distributed Constrained Problem (DisCP) is any problem modelled with DisCSP or one of its extensions.
In the following, we study a particular case of problems, namely mono-variable problems where m = n (i.e., a variable per agent), X (A self ) containing a single variable, x self . Also, in the following frameworks and algorithms, x self , D self , and C self are generalized referring to the projection of the part of different elements from the problem known only by the current agent (called self ).
The problem that each agent has to solve in DisCP is a Stochastic Constraint Optimization Problem (Stochastic COP) or a Stochastic CSP [60] , which are generalizations of Stochastic SAT, SSAT [34] , namely where the local problem has to be solved considering its impact on external variables and constraints whose values are not yet known and that are not under the control of this agent, but that of other agents (commonly, lower priority), values of which the agent may know a probabilistic profile.
2) Existing Solvers: We now introduce some existing solvers for DisCP with which we exemplify extensions based on our utilitarian approach. We consider two well-known solvers for DisCSP (SyncBT and ABT ), and three solvers for DCOPs (called ADOPT , DSA and DBO ): a) Synchronous Backtracking (SyncBT): is the baseline algorithm for DisCSPs [64] , [68] . SyncBT is a simple distribution of the standard backtracking algorithm. Agents consecutively send a satisfying assignment to their variable to the next agent. If an agent is unable to find an instantiation compatible with the current partial assignment it has received, it asks the previous one to change its assignment. The process repeats until a complete solution is built or until the whole search space is explored.
b) Asynchronous Backtracking (ABT): is a common alternative solver for DisCSPs that allows agents to run concurrently and asynchronously [64] . Each agent finds an assignment to its variable and communicates it to the other connected agents having constraints involving this variable. Then agents wait for incoming messages. The assignments received through ok? form a context called agentView. If an agent's assignment is inconsistent with its agentView, it is changed and communicated to the other agents. A subset of an agentView preventing an agent from finding an assignment that does not violate any of its constraints is called a nogood. If an agent infers a nogood from its constraints and its agentView, it asks the lowest priority agent involved in the nogood to change its assignment through a nogood message.
c) Asynchronous Distributed Optimization (ADOPT): guarantees to find the optimal solution and only needs polynomial space [42] , [61] , [56] . ADOPT organizes agents into a depth first search tree in which constraints are only allowed between a variable and any of its acquaintances (parents and descendants in the tree). When the estimated cost of agents' assignment is higher than a given threshold, the agent switches its value assignment to the value with smallest estimated cost. When the upper and lower bounds meet at the root agent, a globally optimal solution has been found and the process finishes. Note that other approaches based on a graph re-arrangement have been explored, for example a cluster exploitation like Asynchronous Partial Overlay [39] , [38] . d) Distributed Stochastic Algorithm (DSA): makes agents start their process by randomly selecting a value [67] . Agents then enter an iteration where they send their last assigned value to their neighbours and collect any new values from them. The next candidate value is chosen based on the values received from other agents and on maximizing a given utility function. This algorithm is incomplete and does not guarantee optimality, but it is frequently efficient for finding solutions close to optimum. e) Distributed Breakout (DBO): is an iterative improvement solver for DCOPs [63] , [28] . The evaluation of a given solution is the summation of the weights for all its violated constraints. An assignment is then changed to decrease the solution value. If the evaluation of the solution cannot be decreased by changing a value, the current state may be a local minimum. In this situation, DBO increases the weights of constraint violation pairs in the current state so that the evaluation of this current state becomes higher than the neighbouring states. Thus, the algorithm can escape from the local minimum.
B. Privacy
We present generalities about privacy, in particular about our definition and typology. This typology will be used to compare existing approaches to privacy in DisCP.
1) Definition and typology: Privacy is the concern of agents to not reveal their personal information. In this work, we define privacy as follows:
Definition 4. Privacy is the utility that agents benefit from conserving the secrecy of their personal information.
Contrary to the standard rewards in DisCSPs, privacy costs are proper to each individual agent. Therefore, the computation is now performed by utility-based and self-interested agents, whose decisions aims at maximizing a utility function. The objective is then to define a policy associating an expected utility maximizing action (communication act or computation) to each state, where the state includes the belief about the global state). In existing works, several approaches have been developed to deal with privacy in DCOPs. Some cryptographic approaches offer certain end-to-end security guarantees by integrating the entire solving process in one primitive for DisCSPs or for DCOPs, the highest level of such privacy guarantees being achievable only for problems with a single variable [54] . Other cryptographic approaches are hybrids interlacing cryptographic and artificial intelligence steps [57] , [21] , [24] . While ensuring privacy in each primitive [29] , cryptographic techniques are usually slower, and sometimes require the use of external servers or computationally intensive secure function evaluation techniques that may not always be available or justifiable for their benefits, making them impractical [22] , or lacking clear global security guarantees. A couple of such approaches with which we compare in more detail are: a) Distributed Pseudo-tree Optimization Procedure with Secret Sharing (SS-DPOP): modifies the standard DPOP algorithm [46] to protect leaves in the depth first search tree, where agents sharing constraints are on the same branch [21] . SS-DPOP uses secret sharing [52] to aggregate the results of a single solution, without revealing the individual valuations this solution consists in. The aggregated values are then passed to the bottom agent, who aggregates this information with its own valuations and sends the aggregate up the chain. [33] has also extended DPOP to preserve different types of privacy using secure multi-party computation.
b) Privacy-Preserving Synchronous Branch and Bound (P-SyncBB): is a cryptographic version of SyncBB [27] , [25] for solving DCOPs while enforcing a stronger degree of constraint privacy [24] . P-SyncBB computes the costs of CPAs (current partial assignments) and compares them to the current upper bound, using secure multi-party protocols. Some protocols were proposed in [24] that can solve problems without resorting to costly transfer sub-protocols, and compare the cost of a CPA shared between two agents to the upper bound held by only one of them. Some variations on the standard SyncBB include NCBB and AFB [20] , [24] .
We choose to deal with privacy by embedding it into agents' decision-making. Other approaches use different metrics and frameworks to quantify privacy loss. According to [23] , agents privacy may concern the four following aspects: Domain privacy: Agents want to keep the domain of their variable private. The common benchmarks and some algorithms (like DPOP , and common cryptographic techniques) assume that all the domains are public, which leads to a complete loss of domain privacy. In the original DisCSP approach a form of privacy of domains is implicit (see ABT ), while being formally required in its PKC extension [6] . Constraint privacy: Agents want to keep the information related to their constraints private [53] . If variables involved in constraints are considered to belong to only one agent, we can distinguish the revelation of information to agents that participate in the constraint (internal constraint privacy) and the one to other agents (external constraint privacy). While common problems with domain privacy can be straightforwardly modelled as problems with constraint privacy, as discussed later, there theoretically exists a kind of domain privacy which cannot be modelled with constraint privacy. Assignment privacy: Agents want to keep the assigned values to their variables private. The revelation of assigned values concerns the assignment of the final solution, as well as the ones proposed during search. Algorithmic privacy: Even though it is commonly assumed that all agents run the same algorithm during the solving, agents may modify the value of some parameters guiding the search process for some personal benefit (e.g., the likelihood of updating its value). This can be achieved by keeping the message structure and contracts of certain existing DisCSP solvers to be used as communication protocols rather than algorithms, as introduced in [55] , where protocols obtained in such ways are compared with respect to the flexibility offered for agents to hide their secrets. Similarly, participants associate a cost to the revelation of each availability and unavailability. Thus, scaling numbers by 1000 for simplicity, corresponding agents associate a cost of 1 to the revelation of their availability at 8 am, a cost of 2 to the one at 10 am, and a cost of 4 to the one at 2 pm. The reward from finding a solution is 4 for A 1 and 5 for both A 2 and A 3 .
For simplicity, in the next sections, we will refer to the possible values by their identifier: 1, 2, and 3 (corresponding to 8 am, 10 am and 2 pm respectively). As this problem states allowed or forbidden values, it is represented by a DisCSP as follows:
As it can be observed, DisCSPs cannot model the information concerning privacy. Now we will show how existing extensions model them.
b) Distributed Private Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DisPrivCSP): models the privacy loss for individual revelations [18] , [55] . It also lets agents abandon the search process when the incremental privacy loss overcomes the expected gains from finding a solution. Each agent pays a cost if the feasibility of each solution is determined by other agents. The reward for solving the problem is given as a constant. Those concepts were so far used for evaluating qualitatively existing algorithms, but were not integrated as heuristics in the search process. Privacy and the usual optimization criteria of Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems are merged into a unique criterion [15] . The additional parameters are a set of privacy coefficients and a set of rewards.
This framework successfully models all the information described in the initial problem and also measures the privacy loss for each agent. However, it was not yet investigated what is the impact of the interruptions when privacy loss exceeds the reward threshold, its relation to utility, or how agents could use this information to modify their behaviour during the search process to preserve more privacy.
c) Valuation of Possible States (VPS):
measures privacy loss by the extent to which the possible states of other agents are reduced [58] , [36] , [35] , [22] . Privacy is interpreted as a valuation on the other agents' estimates about the possible states that one lives in. During the search process, agents propose their values in an order of decreasing preference. At the end of the search process, the difference between the presupposed order of preferences and the real one observed during search determines the privacy loss: the greater the difference, the more privacy has been lost.
However in our sample problem, agents initially know nothing about others agents but the variable they share a constraint with and cannot suppose an order of preference. Agents have no information about others agents privacy requirements. Thus, agents do not expect to receive any value proposal more than another. In this direction one needs to extend VPS to be able to also model the kind of privacy introduced in this example.
d) Partially Known Constraints (PKC): uses entropy, as defined in information theory, to quantify privacy loss [6] . In this method, two variables owned by two different agents may share a constraint. However, not all the forbidden couples of values involved in a constraint are known by both agents. Each agent only knows a subset of the constraints. During the search process, assignment privacy is leaked through ok? and nogood messages, like in standard algorithms. This problem is solved by not sending the value that is assigned to a variable in a ok? message, but the set of values compatible with this assignment. For nogood messages, rather than sending the current assignments, an identifier is used to specify the state of the resolution and to check if some assignments are obsolete or not.
PKC assumes that agents only know their own individual unavailabilities [6] . Only the junction of information known by all agents can rebuild the whole problem. However, while PKC let agents preserve privacy of unary constraints, it does not consider the cost of revelation of assignments.
e) Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem: This example may be defined by a DCOP:
The notation (x = a) is a predicate p stating that variable x is assigned to value a. Each constraint in C is described with the notation {p, v i,p }, and states that if predicate p holds then a cost v i,p is paid by the Agent A i enforcing the constraint.
One could attempt to model the privacy requirements by aggregating the solution quality, related to obtain the reward for a solution (called SolutionCost) and for keeping the privacy (called P rivacyCost) into a unique cost. However, this is not possible. Indeed, in a DCOP, agents explore the search space to find a better solution, and only pay the corresponding solution cost when the search is over and the solution is accepted. This means that the solution cost decreases with time. However, privacy costs are cumulative and are paid during the search process itself (at each time, a solution is proposed), no matter what solution is accepted at the end of the computation. This means that the total privacy loss increases with time. Aggregating the solution costs and privacy costs or using a multi-criteria DCOP would not consider the privacy cost of the solutions that are proposed but not kept as final. Also, a given solution may imply different privacy losses depending on the algorithm used to reach it.
None of the previous techniques consider all aspects of privacy, and while they preserve some privacy, related algorithms require resources or properties from the DisCSP or DCOP that may not be possible due to requirements dictated by the real world problem. We therefore propose to deal with privacy directly from the agents' decision making perspective, using a utility-based approach.
III. UTILITARIAN DISTRIBUTED CONSTRAINED PROBLEM
This section defines our utility-based framework (III-A), and then describes how it models previously presented problems, with different types of privacy requirements (III-B).
A. Definitions
While some previously described frameworks do model the details of our example regarding privacy, it has until now been an open question as to how they can be dynamically used by algorithms in the solution search process. It can be noticed that the rewards and costs in our problem are similar to the utilities commonly used by planning algorithms [31] . Thus, we propose to define a framework that specifies the elements of the corresponding family of planning problems. To do so, we ground the theory of our interpretation of privacy in the well-principled theory of utility-based agents [51] .
Definition 5. A utility-based agent is characterized by its ability to associate a value to each state of the problem, representing its contentment to be in this state.
For example, the state of Agent A i can include the subset of D i that it has revealed and the reward associated to the solution under consideration. The problem is to define a policy for each agent such that their utility is maximized. A policy is a function that associates each state with an action that should be performed in it [48] . We evaluate the utility of a state as follows:
Possible actions are communications dictated by the used solver, and each possible solution proposal, acceptation or rejection, is associated with its corresponding reward (for increasing the probability of problem solving) and cost (for revealing information).
Thus, unlike for DisCPs, the solution of a UDisCP does not necessarily include an agreement, as pursuing the search may imply a decrease of utility. As privacy is lost during search, a given set of assignments can have different utilities, depending on the information exchanged before. We define Utilitarian Distributed Constrained Problem (UDisCP): Definition 6. A Utilitarian Distributed Constrained Problem (UDisCP) is formally defined as a tuple A , X , D, C , U , R , i.e., a DisCP with: • R = {r 1 , . . . , r n } is a vector of rewards, where r i is the reward that Agent A i receives if an agreement is found.
Note that is the case where a domain can be represented on a computer as a type of a parameter to a predefined software function modelling constraints (e.g., an integer), then U d can be embedded in U c , as a unary constraint on the domain. We note also the notations UDisCSP for Utilitarian DisCSP and UDCOP for Utilitarian DCOP.
B. Description on Problems with Privacy
In this section, we present how UDisCP deals with the question of privacy on the two previous examples, and we solve them using our utilitarian extensions of existing solvers. For clarity, unchanged parts of pseudo-codes are shown in gray colour (while our extensions are in black colour). These parts may include variables or procedures that are used in other parts of the solvers but that are not used (and therefore not detailed) in this work.
1) Privacy of Domains:
We propose to revise our previous example and present the extensions for two standard solvers (SyncBT and ABT ). 
Now we discuss how the standard ABT and SyncBT algorithms are adjusted to UDisCSPs. After each state change, each agent computes the estimated utility of the state reached by each possible action, and selects randomly one of the available actions leading to the state with the maximum expected utility.
SyncBTU and ABTU are obtained by similar modifications of SyncBT and ABT [64] , [62] , [68] , respectively. In our extended algorithms, agents compute the frequency of rejection of their solution proposal to estimate the expected utilities. This frequency can be re-evaluated at any moment based on data recorded during previous runs on problems of similar tightness (i.e., having the same proportion of forbidden instantiations). Learning from previous experience has been extensively studied [1] , [2] . The learning can be off-line or on-line. For off-line learning, agents calculate the number of messages ok? and nogood sent during previous executions, called count. They also count how many messages previously sent lead to the termination of the algorithm, in the variable agreementCount. The frequency with which a solution leads to the termination of the algorithm, is called agreementP rob (Equation 2). For on-line learning, one can update the variables count, agreementCount and agreementP rob dynamically whenever the corresponding events happen. When previous experiments are not available, the value of agreementP rob is set to 1 /2 by default (this value is always between 0 and 1).
When ok? messages are sent, the agent has the choice of which assignment to propose. When a nogood message is scheduled to be sent, agents also have choices of how to express them. Before each ok? or nogood message, the agents check which available action leads to the highest expected utility. If the highest expected utility is lower than the current one, the agent announces failure. The result is used to decide between proposing assignments, a nogood, or declaring failure. a) Synchronous Backtracking with Utility (SyncBTU): SyncBTU is obtained by restricting the set of actions to the standard communicative acts of SyncBT , namely ok? and nogood messages. The procedures of a solver like SyncBT define a policy, since they only identify a set of actions (inferences and communications) to be performed in each state. A state of an agent in SyncBT is defined by agentView and a current assignment of the local variable. The local inferences in SyncBTU are obtained from the ones of SyncBT by an extension exploiting the utility information available. The criteria in this research was not to guarantee an optimal policy but to use utility with a minimal change to the original behaviour of SyncBT reinterpreted as a policy. In SyncBTU , the state is extended to also contain a history of revelations of one's values defining an accumulated privacy loss, and a probability to reach an agreement with each action. Since [64] does not provide pseudo-code for SyncBT , we modify the pseudo-code presented in [68] for SyncBTU : assignCPA (before Line 7), and backtrack (before Line 6). As SyncBTU is close from ABTU , we do not detail the pseudo-code for this algorithm in this report.
b) Asynchronous Backtracking with Utility (ABTU): Similar modifications are applied to ABT to obtain ABTU : communications of ABTU are composed of ok?, addlink and nogood. The state and local inferences of ABTU are similar to SyncBTU , while also containing the set of nogoods. 
Algorithm 1: checkAgentView_ABTU
costRound← estimateCostDisCSP (agreementP rob, {v}, agreementP rob × probD); Figure 2 . If the next value, 2 pm, is accepted, A 2 will reach the final state while having revealed x 2 = 1 and x 2 = 3, for a total privacy cost of u d(2,1) + u d(2,3) = 1 + 4 = 5. If it is not, the unavailability of the last value x 2 = 2 will have to be revealed to continue the search process, leading to the revelation of all its assignments for a total cost of 7. Since both these scenarios have a probability of 50% to occur, estimatedCost equals (5 + 7) /2 = 6. The utility (reward−estimatedCost) being equal to 5 − 6 = −1, A 2 has no interest in revealing x 2 = 3 and interrupts the solving. Its final privacy loss is only u d(2,1) = 2. The utility of the final state reached by A 2 being −2 with ABTU, and −4 with ABT, ABTU preserves more privacy than ABT in this problem.
2) Privacy of Assignments:
We would like illustrate how our approach deals with privacy of assignment in UDCOP by extending the previous example and solving it with ADOPTU . Now we discuss how the standard DCOP algorithms are adjusted to UDCOPs. After each state transition, each agent computes the estimated utility of the state reached by each possible action, and selects randomly one of the actions leading to the state with the maximum expected utility. In our algorithms, agents estimate expected utilities using the risk of one of their assignments to not be a part of the final solution.
Example 6. DCOP in Example 2 is extended to a UDCOP by specifying the additional parameters U a and R. U a represents the cost for each agent to reveal each assigned value. R is a default reward (for example, 1000) that each agent gets for finding a solution to the problem, motivating them to initiate the solving. The description is as follows:
To estimate the cost for a DCOP solution, estimateCostDCOP is introduced (Algorithm 3). Its inputs are the utilities considered (U i ), the domain of possible values (D self ) and the already revealed informations (revealedInf os). For each solution, the algorithm evaluates estimatedCost including both constraint costs (i.e., SolutionCost and P rivacyCost).
Recall that the utility of the reached state is calculated by using Equation 1, and equals the fixed reward (by hypothesis) reduced by estimatedCost. If the initial DCOP is a maximization problem, it is first recast as a minimization one, so that constraint values correctly belong to costs.
Algorithm 3: estimateCostDCOP
Input: utilities, D self , revealedInf os Output:
Before proposing a new value, agents estimate the utility that will be reached in the next state. This value is the summation of the costs of revealed agentViews (weighted by their probability to be the final solution) in the said state, and of the corresponding privacy costs. If this utility is lower than the estimation of the current state, the agent proposes the next value, otherwise it keeps its current value. a) Asynchronous Distributed Optimization with Utility (ADOPTU): is a method obtained from ADOPT by adding Lines 7 to 10 in Algorithm 4 (procedure checkAgentView_ADOPTU). At Line 7, the possible next value is set to the value that has the minimal cost. The cost reached after the next value (Line 8) and the cost of the current state (Line 9) are estimated. At Line 10, if the next cost is lower than the current cost, the maximal improvement and the new value are updated. 
3) Privacy of Constraints:
Similarly, we detail the model for our example and we present the extensions of two solvers for UDCOPs (namely DBOU and DSAU ). To adapt existing algorithms for privacy of constraints, revealed domains and possible revealed domains are changed to the revealed constraints and possible revealed constraints, respectively. a) Distributed Breakout with Utility (DBOU): is a solver obtained from DBO by adding Lines 5 to 11 in Algorithm 5 (procedure sendImproveDBOU). At each iteration, DBOU does not only uses solution cost to guide search and computes the value giving maximal improvement as in standard DBO (Lines 2 to 4), but also considers constraint privacy costs (Lines 5 to 7). The new chosen value is the one minimizing total cost (Lines 8 to 11). As privacy loss is cumulative, agents update the set of revealed constraints to also consider previously revealed constraints during their estimation of the reached cost for the different considered values.
b) Distributed Stochastic Algorithm with Utility (DSAU):
is obtained from standard DSA by adding Lines 10 to 13 in Algorithm 6 (procedure DSAU). Each agent computes a solution and sends it to its neighbours (Lines 1 to 5). At each iteration, after collecting new values from neighbours (Line 6), each agent compares the new agentView with the previous one (Line 7). If a difference is detected, the agent A self computes a new solution considering both solution (Lines 8 and 9) and privacy costs (Lines 10 to 13) similarly with ADOPTU and DBOU . 1 + u c(3,2) + u c(3,1) + u c(3,3) ) = 160, for Students A 1 , A 2 , and A 3 respectively. Therefore, using DSAU instead of DSA reduces the utility by 80, 40, 30. In this work, studied problems include only one type of privac at a time, to illustrate proposed models and algorithms with simple examples. However, problems integrating several types of privacy can also be modelled with UDisCP. Such problems, where agents would have optimize multiple objectives, will be investigated in future works.
IV. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
This section deals with three theoretical studies, i.e., comparisons with DCOPs (IV-A), MO-DCOPs (IV-B) and POMDP (IV-C).
A. Comparison with DCOPs
The introduced UDCOP framework can assume that inter-agent constraints are public (without significant loss of generality). This is due to the fact that any problem with private inter-agent constraints, is equivalent with its dual representation where each constraint becomes a variable [3] .
Theorem 1. UDCOP planning and execution is at least as general as DCOPs solving.
Proof. A DCOPs can be modelled as a UDCOPs with all privacy costs equal 0. The obtained UDCOPs would always reach an agreement, if possible. Therefore the goal of a UDCOPs would also match with the goal of the modelled DCOPs. This implies a tougher class of complexity for UDCOPs.
The space complexity required by ABTU and SyncBTU in each agent is identical with the one of ABT and SyncBT , since the only additional structures are the privacy costs associated with its values, constituting a constant factor increases for domain storage Similarly, additional structures with constant values are added from DCOP to UDCOP.
B. Comparison with MO-DCOPs a) Multi-Objective Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem:
A multi-objective optimization problem (MOOP) [37] , [11] is defined as the problem of simultaneously maximizing k objective functions that have no common measure, defined over a set of variables, each one taking its value in a given domain. Thus, a solution to MOOP is a set of assignments maximizing the combination of the objective functions. Here, each objective function can be defined over a subset of variables of the problem. However, to simplify our discourse, we assume that each function is defined over the same set of variables. A Multi-Objective DCOP [8] , called MO-DCOP, is an extension of the standard mono-objective DCOPs.
Note i . The quality of a solution of MO-DCOP is a vector integrating the cost of all weighted constraints. The vectors can be compared using various criteria, such as leximin, maximin, social welfare or Theil index [45] , [41] .
To clarify why Multi-Objective DCOPs (MO-DCOPs) cannot integrate our concept of privacy as one of the criteria they aggregate, we give an example of what would be achieved with MO-DCOPs, as contrasted with the results using DCOPs. We show a comparative trace based on one of the potential techniques in MO-DCOPs, providing a hint on why MO-DCOPs cannot aggregate privacy lost during execution in the same way as UDCOP. In this example, the privacy value of each assignment and its constraint cost are two elements of an ordered pair defining the weight of MO-DCOP. For illustration, in this example pairs of weights are compared lexicographically with the privacy having priority. (Table I) The assumption that each agent owns a single variable is also not restrictive. Multiple variables in an agent can be aggregated into a single variable by Cartesian product. Nevertheless some algorithms can exploit these underlying structures for efficiency, and this has been the subject of extensive research [17] , [40] .
Example 10. We assume to model Example 2 with a MO-DCOP. As also illustrated in the trace
We now discuss how UDisCP can be interpreted as a planning problem.
C. Comparison with POMDPs
The problem that each agent in UDisCP has to solve have similarities to a Partially Observable Markov Decision Problem (POMDP). Given ways to approximate observation and transition conditional probabilities, these problems could be reduced to POMDPs [43] , [30] , [12] .
A POMDP agent regularly reasons in terms of belief (probability distribution over the states), and tries to build a policy, namely a recommendation of each action to be executed as function of current belief. For UDisCP, the corresponding POMDP is defined by the tuple S, A, T, R, Ω, O, γ with components [50] :
• S: Set of states of the agent, defined by possible contents of its agentView, of the nogoods stored by the agent, the knowledge the agent gathers about the secret elements of the UDisCP unknown to it, and the information already revealed.
• A: Set of actions available to an agent, consisting in local reasoning and communication actions that are a function of the selected protocols (i.e., communication language). For example, in ABT these communications actions can have as payloads assignment announcements (ok? messages) and nogoods in (nogood messages).
• T : Set of transition probabilities between states given actions for UDisCP. It is estimated in our approach by training agreementP rob.
• R: Set of rewards of POMDP is the same as R for the corresponding UDisCP.
• Ω: Set of possible observations is given by U , the possible incoming payloads of the communication actions available in UDisCP, as well as possible results of local reasoning steps.
• O: Set of conditional observation probabilities. In reported experiments, it is assumed that the message payloads truthfully reveal the corresponding elements of the states of the other agents, while the probability of the remaining elements have to be inferred by the agent.
• γ: Discount factor set to 1, since we have not taken into consideration the impact of time on utilities in this work. In the next section, we will present experiments that use our UDisCP models and algorithms to preserve privacy.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We describe the experimental protocol for our study (V-A), and then we give the obtained results for DMS context (V-B).
A. Experimental protocol and DMS context
We evaluate our framework and algorithms on randomly generated instances of distributed meeting scheduling problems (DMS) [37] , [5] , [19] . Existing studies has already addressed the question of privacy in DMS problems by considering the information on whether an agent can attend a meeting to be private [59] , [7] .
The algorithm we use to generate the DMS problems is defined according to the following procedure: (i) Variables are created and associated with the agent controlling them. The experiments are carried out on a computer under Windows 7, using a 1 core 2.16 GHz CPU and 4 GiB of RAM. Implementation is done in Java (jre 1.8) using the JADE platform (version 4.3.3) to build the multi-agent system [4] .
The problems are parametrized as follows: 10, 20, or 40 agents, 10 possible values, and the cost of a revelation is a random number between 0 and 9. These parameters are used to guarantee that the problems are not over-constrained or under-constrained, as the probability to find a solution increases with the increase of domain size, and with the decrease of the number of agents and unary constraint tightness. Density is defined as the proportion of binary constraints in C among X i × X j (i = j). Because of the constraint requiring all couples of variables to be equals, density in DMS is always 1. Tightness is defined as proportion of forbidden tuples among all constraints (binary but also unary ones) of C .
Proof. For DMS, we assume t for constraint tightness, m for the number of agents A and d for the size of each domain set D i . Indeed, the probability that a given value is authorized is:
The probability that a given value is authorized by all agents is:
The probability that a given value is forbidden by at least one agent is:
The problem has a probability s to have at least one solution if and only if:
Figures 3 corroborates this for a DMS modelled by DisCSP with a probability of 50% to have at least one solution, as depicted according to the previous formula and to experimental results. These figures are described by the number of agents (coordinate x), domain size (coordinate y) and tightness (coordinate z). For example, to have a probability of 50% to have a solution, we see that a DMS with 8 agents (x = 3), and a domain size of 8 (y = 3), needs to be parametrized with a tightness of 27% (z = 27). For a problem with 16 agents (i.e., x = 4) and a same domain size (y = 3) and a probability to have a solution, the tightness becomes 14% (z = 14). Note that in the experimental plot, values may slightly differ due to the discrete nature of domains size. Later, this formula will be used to generate problems with relevant parameters values and that are not under-or over-constrained. We will verify that probability to find a solution to DMS is negatively correlated with the number of agents, constraints tightness, and positively correlated with domains size. Each set of reported experiments is an average estimation of 50 instances for the different algorithms (SyncBT -SyncBTU , ABT -ABTU , ADOPT -ADOPTU , DBO -DBOU and DSA -DSAU ). Tables II and III show the average privacy loss per agent during the execution of the solving algorithms for DisCSPs (SyncBT , ABT ), DCOPs (DBO , DSA , and ADOPT ), and of their respective extensions, with several values for the number of agents, the domain size and the constraints tightness. Bold data points show instances with high privacy loss (from 10.0 to 20.0). Privacy loss of 20.0 is the maximal value before interrupting solving. Empty data points show instances with low privacy loss (below 0.1). Moreover, we refer to a data point in these tables as solver(nbAgents, domainSize, tightness). For example, SyncBT (10, 20, 30) refers to the average privacy loss for instances with 10 agents, a domain size of 20, and a constraint tightness of 30% solved with SyncBT , namely 6.7. Tables II and III , increasing the number of agents implies a reduction of the number of solutions. Thus, problems being over-constrained, agents interrupt the solving faster, which can explain the reduction of average privacy loss for problems with many agents. Indeed, we see that most instances with 10 agents have a significant average privacy loss, while instances with 40 agents have low privacy loss. For example, in Table II , for solver (10, 10, 50) , all solvers imply a privacy loss (3.5, 0.6, 1.6, 1.5) for SyncBT -SyncBTU and ABT -ABTU , respectively. However, for solver (40, 10, 50) all the previous solvers have empty data points. Similarly for Table III , results obtained for 40 agents give also a lower privacy losses for the same reasons.
B. Experiments on UDisCP
b) : Moreover, we also see that for these two tables, high privacy loss is correlated with a high tightness and a high domain size. Table II shows that the number of high privacy loss depend on the tightness (more than 30%) and a domain size up to 30. For example, for ABT U (10,10,50), privacy loss is 1.5, while it is 6.0 for ABTU (10, 40, 50) . Table III shows that high privacy loss (bold data points) never occurs for instances with a domain size of 10, while it does for most problems with a domain size of 40. For example, for ADOPT (10, 10, 50) , privacy loss is 8.8, while ADOPT (10, 40, 50) gives 20.0. For these two tables, the main reason is that a higher domain size allows more solution proposals and avoids premature interruptions. c) : Finally, recall that the difference of values between different families of solvers is explained by the different types of privacy considered (i.e., domain, assignment and constraint), as the number of revelations of assignments differs from the number of revelations of constraints. (10,40,t) with t ∈ {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}, the assignment privacy loss is {6.2, 7.6, 10.2, 12.4, 16}. However with the same parameters for ADOPTU , it is {4.4, 5.5, 6.2, 7.3, 7.6}. The loss is reduced with our extension as search is driven by objective to minimize the assignment privacy loss, and interrupt solving if necessary. Table III measures constraint privacy loss with DBO -DBOU and DSA -DSAU . We see that DBO and DBOU are better than DSA and DSAU , likely due to the fact that with DBO , only one agent changes its value at each iteration, while with DSA all agents do, which implies an increase of the number of exchanged messages. For example, in Table III for solver (10, 20, 50 ) privacy loss drops from 2.1 to 1.3 and from 10.9 to 3.9 for DBO -DBOU and DSA -DSAU respectively. For all these algorithms dealing with different types of privacy, an increase of privacy loss with initial solvers implies a better preservation with extended ones.
VI. CONCLUSION
While many approaches have been proposed recently for dealing with privacy in distributed constraint satisfaction and optimization problems, none of them is exempt from limitations. These approaches may require particular properties from the initial problem, or may consider certain aspects of privacy only. In this work, we propose the Utilitarian Distributed Constrained Problem (UDisCP) framework. The framework models the privacy loss for the revelation of an agent's constraints as a utility function, letting agents integrate privacy requirements directly in their search process. Solving the problem then consists in finding the best compromise between solution quality and privacy loss, instead of focusing only on solution quality. We propose extensions to existing algorithms for DisCSPs (SyncBTU , ABTU ) and DCOPs (DBOU , DSAU , and ADOPTU ) that let agents use information about privacy to modify their behaviour and guide their search process, by proposing values that reduce the amount of privacy loss, and compare them on different types of distributed meeting scheduling problems. The comparison shows that explicit modelling and reasoning with the utility of privacy allows for significant savings in privacy with minimal impact on the quality of the achieved solutions.
Our approach has several possible extensions. For future works, we first plan to extend our models and algorithms to more general problems modelled with constraints, namely problems with n-ary constraints (not only binary ones) as well as multi-variable problems, where each agent may control several variables. In this case, the solution of an agent is a set of assignments, rather than a single assignment. Further, we want to investigate the notion of ethics [9] , implying that agents may have remorse for lying when modifying their behaviour for privacy. These notion of ethics leads to the building of communities of interests between agents [65] , [66] , where privacy costs will differ according to the recipient of a message, instead of being random. A DisCSP modelling was used for road traffic in [13] , [14] , and we would like to apply our model of privacy for road traffic simulation where the agents/drivers may choose whether to reveal some private data concerning for example their driving, or their habits. Indeed, we think that our privacy model may also be adapted to other applications such as multi-robot exploration [44] or smart energy [49] .
